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We study the complete set packing problem (CSPP) where the family of feasible subsets
may include all possible combinations of objects. This setting arises in applications such as
combinatorial auctions (for selecting optimal bids) and cooperative game theory (for ﬁnding
optimal coalition structures). Although the set packing problem has been well-studied in the
literature, where exact and approximation algorithms can solve very large instances with up
to hundreds of objects and thousands of feasible subsets, these methods are not extendable
to the CSPP since the number of feasible subsets is exponentially large. Formulating the
CSPP as an MILP and solving it directly, using CPLEX for example, is impossible for
problems with more than 20 objects. We propose a new mathematical formulation for the
CSPP that directly leads to an eﬃcient algorithm for ﬁnding feasible set packings (upper
bounds). We also propose a new formulation for ﬁnding tighter lower bounds compared
to LP relaxation and develop an eﬃcient method for solving the corresponding large-scale
MILP. We test the algorithm with the winner determination problem in spectrum auctions,
the coalition structure generation problem in coalitional skill games, and a number of other
simulated problems that appear in the literature.
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21. Introduction and Literature Review
1.1. The Set Packing Problem (SPP)
The set packing problem and its variants (the set covering and set partitioning problems) are
among the most well-studied problems in combinatorial optimisation thanks to their wide ranges
of applications, their elegant mathematical formulation, and their special structural properties. In
the SPP, there are n objects which can be packed into a number of subgroups among m predeﬁned
feasible subsets labelled as S1, . . . ,Sm. Each subset Sj has a payoﬀ value of vj. The SPP aims to
divide these n objects into non-overlapping subgroups such that their total payoﬀ is maximised.
The problem has many applications such as for routing and scheduling trains at intersections in
railway operations (Zwaneveld et al. [35]), for selecting winning bids in combinatorial auctions
(De Vries and Vohra [16]), for surgical operations scheduling (Vela´squez and Melo [34]), and for
packets scheduling and transmission in communication networks (Emek et al. [18]) among many
others. In the context of combinatorial auctions, the winner determination problem (WDP) is
essentially a set packing problem. Sandholm [32] develops an algorithm that utilises the graphical
representation of the coalition structure search space for solving the WDP. Fujishima et al. [19]
develop an exact algorithm, where caching and pruning are used to speed up the search, and a
heuristic algorithm for solving the WDP.
The tractability of the SPP depends on the structure of the underlying IP formulation. Specif-
ically, Mu¨ller [28] and Rothkopf et al. [31] summarise special cases where the corresponding LP
relaxation solutions satisfy the integrality constraints and hence are also solutions of the SPP.
These are, however, very restrictive cases and it is generally very diﬃcult to solve the SPP. In
fact, Karp [23] shows that the SPP problem is NP-complete while Sandholm [32] shows the inap-
proximability of the problem for general cases. Many methods, both exact and approximation,
have been proposed for solving the SPP. Padberg [29] and Ca´novas et al. [7] show diﬀerent sets of
facets of the set packing polyhedron which can be used to strengthen the LP relaxation solutions.
Landete et al. [24] present an alternative formulation for the SPP in a higher-dimensional space
where a set of facets can be identiﬁed.
Methods for solving the SPP often start with solving the corresponding LP relaxation problem.
De Vries and Vohra [16] survey diﬀerent methods such as a constraint generation method for
solving the LP relaxation problem and a sub-gradient method for solving the Lagrangian relaxation.
The authors also provide interesting insights on how the numerical algorithm is interpreted in
the auctioning process. These methods have actually been well-studied in the context of the set
covering problem (SCP), a variant of the SPP where the objective is to minimise the total cost of
covering all the objects (see Beasley [4] and Beasley and Jo¨rnsten [6] for examples). Caprara et al.
[10] survey methods to solve the SCP and compare their numerical performance on test problems
that appear in the literature.
There are also many heuristic methods for solving the SPP. In fact, Hoﬀman and Padberg [22]
state that “virtually every heuristic approach for solving general integer programming problems has
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GRASP, a greedy randomised algorithm for solving the set packing problem. Beasley and Chu [5]
develop a genetic algorithm for solving the set covering problem and this method can be adapted
to solve the SPP.
1.2. The Complete Set Packing Problem (CSPP)
In this paper, we aim to solve the SPP for cases when m= 2n, i.e. any subset of objects can be
grouped together in a packing, or when m is relatively large compared to n. This setting arises in
applications such as combinatorial auctions where bidders submit their bids in the form of value
functions on the objects selected. This bidding mechanism is favourable to auction designers and to
bidders because the information can be communicated in a more compact way. Another application
area is in multi-agent systems, e.g. in a sensor network [14], where players are grouped into coalitions
to maximise their total utility. As the number of possible subsets can grow exponentially, existing
methods (such as [6, 10, 19, 32]) are not applicable due to the large number of binary decision
variables involved.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of all objects and let x= (x1, x2, . . . , x2n) be a vector of binary vari-
ables with xj indicating whether subset Sj is selected in the packing. The CSPP can be formulated
as an MILP as follows:
CSPP(N ,v) := max
x
vtx
s.t. ANx≤ e,
x∈ {0,1}2n ,
(1)
where AN ∈Rn×2n is a matrix with element aij in row i and column j indicating whether subset
Sj contains object i, and e∈Rn is a vector with all elements being equal to one. For convenience
in notation, let aj = (a1j, . . . , anj)
t be a column vector of binary indicators for each j ∈ {1, ..,2n}.
To avoid ambiguity in the ordering of aj, we assign aj to the binary representation of (j− 1). Let
us denote vj ≡ v(aj)≡ v(Sj) as the payoﬀ of subset Sj. For n≤ 15, problem CSPP(N ,v) can be
solved eﬃciently by CPLEX through a classical branch and bound technique. However, the size
of the MILP problem grows exponentially as the number of objects increases and it is impossible
for CPLEX to solve instances with more than 20 objects. We aim to develop an approximation
method for solving this MILP.
1.3. The Winner Determination Problem in Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions have been used in the procurement of London bus routes (Cantillon and
Pesendorfer [8]), radio spectrum (Cramton [12]), and truckload transportation (Caplice and Sheﬃ
[9]), among many others. Combinatorial auctions arise in situations where bidders are interested
in buying bundles of objects that inherit some level of synergies among themselves. One of the
key problems in combinatorial auction is to ﬁnd the best feasible combination of bids to maximise
the total payoﬀ. This problem is equivalent to a complete set packing problem where objects are
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combinatorial auction literature, solution approaches such as Fujishima et al. [19] and Sandholm
[32] often assume that the number of bids are relatively small compared to the number of objects,
i.e. a few hundreds of objects and a few thousands of bids at most. However, in many real-life
situations such as in spectrum auctions, bidders might be interested in buying any subset of their
predeﬁned frequencies. In this case, the bidders may express their interest through a compact value
function that involves their objects of interest and their speciﬁc synergy parameters (Cramton
et al. [13] and De Vries and Vohra [15]). Therefore, the set of feasible bids from all the bidders
is an exponential function of the number of objects. We discuss about one such case in spectrum
auctions in subsection 3.1.
1.4. The Optimal Coalition Structure Generation Problem in Cooperative Game Theory
Cooperative games with transferable utilities belong to a branch of game theory where groups of
players can form coalitions in order to jointly achieve the groups’ objectives. Cooperative game
theory has many applications in economics and business (e.g. for setting insurance premiums [26],
and for setting interchange fees for ATM bank networks [20]), in law and political science (e.g. for
computing voting power [25]), and in artiﬁcial intelligence (e.g. for coalition structure formation in
multi-agent systems [11]), among many others. One of the key problems in coalitional games is to
ﬁnd a coalition structure, i.e. to divide the set of all players into disjoint subsets called coalitions,
such that the total payoﬀ of these coalitions is maximised. This problem is equivalent to a CSPP
where players are viewed as objects, coalitions are viewed as subgroups, and a coalition structure
is equivalent to a packing. Sandholm et al. (1999) present a coalition structure graph to visualise
the set of all possible coalition structures. The authors then show interesting results about the
guaranteed bound on the best coalition structure within certain parts of the graph. Since then, new
exact methods have been introduced to exploit the special search space of the coalition structures.
However, these existing methods are only applicable for games with less than 30 players (Rahwan
et al. [30].)
1.5. Contributions
In this manuscript, we develop an approximation method for solving the CSPP. Our contributions
include the following:
1. We propose a new mathematical formulation for the CSPP that makes use of the subsets sug-
gested by the LP solution (or any heuristic solution and their combination). The new formulation
directly suggests an eﬃcient method for generating near-optimal feasible packings.
2. We propose a method to ﬁnd tighter upper bounds (compared to LP relaxation). This involves
a constraint generation framework to solve the corresponding large-scale MILP problem.
53. We demonstrate the algorithm with the winner determination problem that arises in spectrum
auctions. We show that the constraint generation problem can be solved in O(n2 logn) and that
the LP relaxation problem can be solved in polynomial time. We provide numerical results for
instances with up to 200 objects.
4. We also perform numerical tests on the optimal coalition structure generation problem that
arises in large weighted coalitional skill games (Bachrach et al. [2]) and a number of other simulated
combinatorial auction settings that are accompanied by underlying economical interpretations
(Leyton-Brown and Shoham [27].)
The structure for the rest of the paper is as follows. We provide an alternative formulation for the
CSPP problem in subsection 2.1. This leads to an eﬃcient method for ﬁnding feasible packings in
subsection 2.2. The upper bounds are obtained by solving the LP relaxation and a large-scale MIP
relaxation. These are done via constraint generation frameworks to be described in subsections 2.3
and 2.4. We demonstrate the algorithm through two applications in combinatorial auctions and
cooperative games in subsections 3.1 and 3.2. We provide numerical results in Section 4 and ﬁnally
conclude in Section 5.
2. Fast Approximation Algorithm for Solving the CSPP
2.1. Alternative Formulation for CSPP
Let I be the indices of columns that we have a high expectation on where the optimal set of subsets
will lie on, and let J be the indices of the remaining columns. For now, we assume that I and J
are given. The CSPP can be reformulated as:
max
xI ,xJ
vtIxI +v
t
JxJ ,
s.t. AIxI +AJxJ ≤ e,
xI ∈ {0,1}|I|,xJ ∈ {0,1}|J |,
(2)
where the matrix A, cost vector v and decision variable x are divided into two subsets according
to indices (I,J ), i.e. ⎡
⎣Av
x
⎤
⎦=
⎡
⎣AI AJvI vJ
xI xJ
⎤
⎦ .
Problem (2) can be reformulated as a bi-level optimisation problem:
max
xI∈{0,1}|I|
vtIxI + max
xJ ∈{0,1}|J |
vtJxJ ,
AJxJ ≤ e−AIxI,
AIxI ≤ e.
(3)
Let us denote f ∗IP (N ,v) as the optimal value of CSPP(N ,v). We also use shorthand notation
f ∗IP ≡ f ∗IP (N ,v) where there is no confusion for not specifying (N ,v). For each choice of xI , let
N\AIxI be the set of remaining objects after subsets in AI have been selected according to the
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of N\AIxI can obtain. Then the second-level optimisation problem is equivalent to another set
packing problem on the remaining objects. The bi-level problem becomes:
max
xI
vtIxI + f
∗
IP (N\AIxI ,v\AIxI),
AIxI ≤ e, xI ∈ {0,1}|I|.
(4)
It is interesting to note that the reformulation has a smaller number of binary variables, i.e.
xI ∈ {0,1}|I|, instead of 2n binary variables that appear in model (1). However, this comes at a cost
of having an unknown non-linear term f ∗IP (N\AIxI ,v\AIxI). Indeed, this quantity is the payoﬀ
of the optimal set packing problem on the remaining objects. This means the problem is still hard
but this makes sense since two equivalent formulations should have the same level of complexity.
Notice, however, that the reformulation can provide us an idea of how to ﬁnd a near-optimal
solution as will be described next.
2.2. Finding Near-Optimal Set Packings (Lower Bounds)
Instead of maximising the entire quantity {vtIxI + f ∗IP (N\AIxI,v\AIxI)}, let us approximate
the problem by replacing the second term f ∗IP (N\AIxI,v\AIxI) with its linear approximation
ct(e−AIxI) as follows:
CSPPsub :=max
x
vtIxI + c
t(e−AIxI),
s.t. AIxI ≤ e,
x∈ {0,1}|I|,
where c is the vector of payoﬀs that individual objects can obtain and (e−AIxI) is the indicator
vector of the remaining objects. The corresponding formulation is an MILP with n linear constraints
and with |I| variables and could be solved eﬃciently by CPLEX, or some existing algorithms for
solving the set packing problem (e.g. [6, 10, 19, 32]) for relatively small |I|. We notice that the
objective function is equivalent to (vtI − ctAI)xI where (vtI − ctAI) is the corresponding reduced
cost vector for xI . After having found x∗I, we can solve a new CSPP problem on the remaining
objects to ﬁnd f ∗IP (N\AIx∗I ,v\AIx∗I). This can be done through an exact algorithm if the number
of remaining objects is relatively small, or through an approximation method such as the one we
are describing otherwise. Formally, this is described in Algorithm 1.
In step (1) of Algorithm 1, we ﬁnd an initial set of potential subsets that might appear in the
optimal packing. We will use the set I that is suggested by the LP relaxation solution. A possible
method for solving the LP relaxation is described in subsection 2.4. Notice, however, that the
algorithm is very ﬂexible in choosing the candidate set. In fact, the set I can also be obtained from
any heuristic solution or from a combination thereof. In step (2) we solve problem CSPPsub to
ﬁnd a near-optimal solution to the reformulation of CSPP in model (4). In step (3) we update the
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Initialisation: Set k=1, N (k) =N , f ∗sub = 0.
while N (k) = ∅ do
1. Find the set of candidate subsets I that is suggested by an LP relaxation solution.
2. Solve CSPPsub. Let x
∗
I be an optimal solution.
3. Update:
f ∗sub = f
∗
sub+v
t
Ix
∗
I , N
(k+1) =N (k)\AIxI ,v(k+1) = v(k)\AIxI, k = k+1.
end while
Return solution f ∗sub.
approximated objective value, the set of remaining objects, and their reduced vector of the payoﬀ
values. The ﬁrst result we can see immediately is that the algorithm provides us a feasible packing
solution and a lower bound to the CSPP as formally stated in the Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Algorithm 1 produces a lower bound on the CSPP, i.e. f ∗sub ≤ f ∗IP .
Proof Since Algorithm 1 selects no same object twice for diﬀerent subsets, it produces a feasible
packing solution with f ∗sub being the packing’s total payoﬀ. Thus, f
∗
sub ≤ f ∗IP . 
Given the lower bound of CSPP, we are interested in judging how good the bound is. In theory,
the quality of the approximated solution depends on how good the linear approximation ct(e−
AIxI) is compared to f ∗IP (N\AIxI,v\AIxI) around the truth optimum. In general, the linear
approximation is more accurate if ||e−AxI|| is small. In other words, the higher the accuracy
of picking the right candidate subset I, the smaller the size of the remaining set, and hence the
more accurate the linear approximation is. It is important that the approximated function f˜(xI) is
close to the original objective function f(xI) around the optimum xI. Notice also that, due to the
discreteness of xI, it is still possible for f˜(xI) to have the same optimum as f(xI) even though the
two functions diﬀer at x∗I . It is easy to extend the algorithm to use a quadratic approximation of
f ∗IP (N\AIxI ,v\AIxI) and this would enhance the quality of the bound. However, this will come
at a cost of having a more computationally expensive approximation and hence the choice would
depend on how we want to trade oﬀ between the quality of the solution and the computation time.
We will use the upper bounds found via LP and MILP relaxation (to be described in subsections
2.3 and 2.4) to estimate the optimality gap of the solutions found by Algorithm 1.
2.3. Finding Upper Bound via MILP Relaxation
In LP relaxation, we relax the binary constraints on x and this provides us with an upper bound
to the CSPP. However, due to the excessive relaxation on all the 2n binary variables, the quality
of the bound might not be good enough for some instances. With the expectation that the optimal
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relaxed while still enforcing xI to be binary as follows:
CSPPMIP :=max
x
vtIxI +v
t
JxJ ,
s.t. AIxI +AJxJ ≤ e,
xI ∈ {0,1}|I|,
xJ ≥ 0,
where the constraint xJ ∈ {0,1}|J| has been relaxed to xJ ≥ 0. Notice that we do not have to
include xJ ≤ 1 because the packing constraint {AIxI +AJxJ ≤ e} has already enforced this. We
call this an MIP relaxation and notice that it has |I| binary variables and |J | continuous variables.
We will choose |I| relatively small, i.e. |I| ∼ n	 2n, and hence CSPPMIP is much easier to solve
compared to the original MILP but still more diﬃcult than the LP relaxation due to the presence
of the binary variable xI . Solving CSPPMIP will provide us a better upper bound to the CSPP
compared to the LP relaxation, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The following inequalities hold: f ∗LP ≥ f ∗MIP ≥ f ∗IP ≥ f ∗sub.
Proof The ﬁrst two inequalities are obvious since CSPPLP is a linear relaxation of CSPPMIP (on
variable xI) and CSPPMIP is a linear relaxation of CSPP (on variable xJ ). The last inequality
was derived in Lemma 1. 
Despite the tighter bound obtained, solvingCSPPMIP given its exponential size is very challenging.
Due to the presence of the binary variable xI, we cannot apply the classical column generation
approach to handle the exponentially large number of columns. In what follows, we will present a
new approach for solving CSPPMIP.
We notice that CSPPMIP can be reformulated as a bi-level optimisation problem as follows:
max
xI∈{0,1}|I|
vtIxI + max
xJ ≥0
vtJxJ ,
AJxJ ≤ e−AIxI ,
AIxI ≤ e.
Due to the boundedness and the non-emptiness of the constraint set on xJ , we can replace the
LP in the second level with its dual:
max
xI∈{0,1}|I|
vtIxI + min
β≥0
βt(e−AIxI),
AtJβ≥ vJ ,
AIxI ≤ e.
Let FJ := {β :AtJβ≥ vJ ,β≥ 0}; the bi-level problem can be further reformulated as:
max
xI∈{0,1}|I|,δ
vtIxI + δ
s.t. βt(e−AIxI)≥ δ ∀β ∈FJ .
(5)
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semi-inﬁnite number of constraints (one for each β ∈ FJ). Due to the linearity of the constraints
on β, the semi-inﬁnite constraints are equivalent to a ﬁnite set of constraints for all the extreme
points and extreme rays {β1, . . . ,βK} of FJ . Model (5) can be reformulated as:
CSPPMIP2 := max
xI∈{0,1}|I|,δ
vtIxI + δ
s.t. β(k)t(e−AIxI)≥ δ, ∀k= 1, . . . ,K.
(6)
The new MIP problem has |I| binary variables, one continuous variable, and K linear constraints
where K could be exponentially large. This means the reformulation is still as complex as the
original MIP but this makes sense since the two are equivalent. However, the formulation deﬁned
by CSPPMIP2 allows us to apply a constraint generation framework where only relevant extreme
points and extreme rays of FJ are introduced to the model, as described in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Constraint Generation Algorithm for Solving MIP relaxation
Initialisation: Start with any initial relaxed constraint setM(0) = {β(0)}, where β(0) is a feasible
point in FJ and set k=0.
loop
1. Set k= k+1 and solve the relaxed problem:
(x
(k)
I , δ
(k)) = argmin
x,δ
{
vtIxI + δ : (e−AIxI)tβ(j) ≥ δ, ∀j ∈ {0, . . . , k− 1}
}
.
2. Solve the constraint generation problem:
β(k) = min
β
{
βt(e−AIx(k)I ) : AtJβ ≥ vJ , β≥ 0.
}
if (e−AIx(k)I )tβ(k) ≥ δ(k) then
Terminate the loop.
else
Update M(k) = {M(k−1),β(k)}.
end if
end loop
Return optimal solution x∗I =x
(k)
I and set f
∗
MIP = v
t
Ix
∗
I + δ
(k).
In step (1) of Algorithm 2, we solve a relaxed problem of CSPPMIP2. This is an MIP and can
be handled by CPLEX for reasonably large n (up to a few hundred objects) as long as we keep
track of the number of constraints generated, i.e. we keep k below some bound relative to n. In step
(2) we solve the constraint generation problem. Notice the problem has exactly the same structure
compared to the dual of CSPPLP. We describe a solution approach for solving this problem in
subsection 2.4.
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It is important to note that we cannot apply a column generation algorithm directly to the
original MIP as that would not provide us a proof of optimality even when no further improving
column can be found, i.e. we could be trapped in local optimum due to the presence of the binary
variable xI . However, with the reformulation in CSPPMIP2, we have a proof of optimality on the
constraint generation algorithm once no further violating constraints are found.
2.4. Solving the LP Dual
Consider the dual of CSPPLP:
CSPPLPD :=min e
ty,
s.t. atjy≥ v(aj), ∀j ∈ {1, ..,2n},
y≥ 0.
The dual problem contains a decision variable y ∈Rn and an exponentially large number of con-
straints. The optimal value of the dual LP relaxation problem, denoted as f ∗LP , provides us an
upper bound on the optimal value of the original MILP. From this, we obtain f ∗sub/f
∗
LP as a guaran-
teed optimality bound of the feasible packing found in subsection 2.2. Although this upper bound
is not as tight as the MIP upper bound, it is computationally less expensive and might be more
appropriate to use in situations with limited computational resources. For n ≤ 20, we can solve
CSPPLPD easily by using an LP solver like CPLEX. For n≥ 30, the problem contains more than
a trillion constraints and this makes it diﬃcult to solve. However, it is interesting to observe that
only a small number of constraints are tight at the optimal solution. This means the remaining
non-binding constraints can be relaxed without changing the optimal solution. We can start with a
relaxed problem of CSPPLPD with a small set of constraints and then keep introducing violating
constraints to the relaxed problem until all the constraints are satisﬁed. At that point, the optimal
solution of the relaxed problem is also the optimal solution of the original problem. Formally, the
constraint generation method for solving CSPPLPD is described in Algorithm 3.
In step (1) of Algorithm 3, we ﬁnd a subset z that violates constraint {zty(k) ≥ v(z)} mostly for
the given proposal y(k). Here, a subset is characterised by a binary indicator vector z with zi = 1 if
object i is in the subset and zi = 0 otherwise. We then check the optimality condition. If the worst
subset is not violated, then all other subsets satisfy this constraint and hence y(k) is an optimal
solution of CSPPLPD. Otherwise, we introduce the newly generated constraint {wty− v(w)≥ 0}
to the relaxed problem. In step (2), we solve the updated relaxed problem to obtain a new proposal
y(k) before going back to step (1).
Notice that the relaxed problem is an LP with smaller size and is easy to solve. The key, and often
the diﬃcult part, for a successful constraint generation algorithm is the ability to generate violating
constraints eﬃciently. We will show that the CG problem in the spectrum auction application can
be solved in O(n2 logn). We will also show that the constraint generation problem in the WCSG
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Algorithm 3 Constraint Generation Algorithm for Solving LP relaxation
Initialisation: Start with any initial weight vector y(0) and initial relaxed constraint set M(0)
and set k =0.
loop
1. Solve the constraint generation problem: w = argmin
z∈{0,1}n
{
zty(k)− v(z)} .
if wty(k)− v(w)≥ 0 then
Terminate the loop.
else
Update relax set: M(k+1) = {M(k),w}.
end if
2. Set k = k + 1 and solve the relaxed problem:
y(k) = argmin
y
{
ety : zty≥ v(z), ∀z ∈M(k)} .
end loop
Return optimal solution y∗ = y(k) and set f ∗LP = e
ty∗.
games with reasonable size (i.e. n≤ 200) can also be solved very eﬃciently. Some remarks on the
constraint generation problem follow.
• The constraint generation problem does not have to be solved exactly at every step except for
the last step. In fact, any violating constraint could be added to the relaxed problem. It is only
in the last step before terminating the loop that we need to obtain an optimal solution w and to
check if {wty(k)− v(w)≥ 0}.
• In some instances, the constraint generation problem might turn out to be very diﬃcult to be
solved to optimality. In this case, we can still obtain an upper bound to the CSPP as stated in
Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Let y(k) be the optimal solution of the relaxed problem at iteration k in Algorithm 3
and let =maxj{vj −atjy(k)}; then we have:
ety(k) ≤ ety∗ ≤ ety(k)+n.
Proof Since y∗ is an optimal solution of CSPPLPD, it is also a feasible solution of any LP
relaxation problem at any iteration k. Thus, its objective value ety∗ should be at least the optimal
value ety(k) of the relaxed LP, i.e. ety(k) ≤ ety∗. We can also show that x= y(k) + e is a feasible
solution to the relaxed LP by verifying that both the constraints atjx≥ v(aj), ∀j ∈ {1, ..,2n} and
x ≥ 0 are satisﬁed. By the deﬁnition of  = maxj{vj − atjy(k)} and by the construction of the
algorithm, we have ≥ 0 before the loop in Algorithm 3 terminates. Thus, x= y(k)+ e≥ y(k) ≥ 0.
For j = 1 we have aj = 0 and vj =0 and hence the constraint a
t
jx≥ v(aj) holds trivially. For j ≥ 2,
we have:
atjx = a
t
jy
(k)+ atje
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≥ atjy(k)+ 
≥ atjy(k)+(vj −atjy(k)) = vj.
Thus, x is a feasible solution to CSPPLPD. Therefore,
ety∗ ≤ etx= ety(k)+ ete= ety(k)+n.

The implication of Theorem 1 is that if  is suﬃciently small relative to ety(k), we can stop the
CG algorithm and use the upper bound (ety(k)+n) instead of ety∗.
3. Applications to Combinatorial Auctions and Cooperative Game Theory
3.1. The Winner Determination Problem in Spectrum Auctions
In a spectrum auction, there are n frequencies (objects) and m bidders. Each bidder is interested
in a subset of frequencies. Let Φ∈Rm×n be a 0-1 matrix where φij = 1 indicates whether bidder i
has an interest in frequency j and φij = 0 otherwise. We follow the model suggested by Cramton
et al. [13] and De Vries and Vohra [15] and assume that the individual object j has a payoﬀ value
of vj. Bidder i will value a subset S of frequencies as {
∑
i∈S vi + μi
∑
k,q∈S∩φi vkvq} where μi is a
parameter that models how strong bidder i views the complementarities (De Vries and Vohra [15]).
The largest bid on a subset S is:
v(z) =max
i∈N
⎧⎨
⎩
∑
i∈S
vi+μi
∑
k,q∈S∩φi
vkvq
⎫⎬
⎭ . (7)
Notice that v(z) is not given explicitly. To apply existing methods, we would have had to evaluate
v(z) for all z just to obtain the input to the CSPP. This is very expensive computationally. We
will show that, by applying our constraint generation framework, we will eliminate this stage and
only perform the calculation if needed. Speciﬁcally, we can combine the max operator in (7) into
the max operator of the CG problem as follows:
max
z
{
v(z)− zty}
⇔ max
z,i∈N
⎧⎨
⎩
∑
i∈S
vi +μi
∑
k,q∈S∩φi
vkvq − zty
⎫⎬
⎭
⇔ max
i∈N
max
z
⎧⎨
⎩
∑
i∈S
vi +μi
∑
k,q∈S∩φi
vkvq − zty
⎫⎬
⎭
⇔ max
i∈N
max
z
{
vtz− zty+μi((φiv)tz)2
}
⇔ max
i∈N
max
z
{
(btz)2−atz} , (8)
where a= y−v, and b= (φiv) is the element-wise production of the two vectors φi and v.
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For each ﬁxed i, the CG problem is a quadratic binary optimisation problem (QBP) which is
NP-hard to solve except for special cases. Among these, Allemand et al. [1] develop a polynomial
time algorithm for solving unconstrained ﬁxed-ranked homogeneous QBP, i.e. one with the form
maxz∈{0,1}n {ztQz} whereQ is a symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix with a ﬁxed rank. Speciﬁcally,
the authors show that there is an O(nd−1) algorithm for solving the QBP where d is the rank
of Q. We will extend this result to the case of nonhomogeneous ﬁxed-ranked QBP and show an
O(n2 logn) algorithm for solving the constraint generation problem.
Theorem 2. The constraint generation problem described in (8) can be solved in O(n2 logn).
Proof In the CG problem, we need to maximise {(btz)2−atz}. For each z ∈ {0,1}n, let P (z) =
(atz,btz) be the corresponding point in a 2-dimensional space, i.e. P (z) : {0,1}n →R2. Since there
are 2n such points z, we have 2n corresponding points P (z) in 2-D. It is very interesting, however,
that the convex hall of these points has at most 2n extreme points (Allemand et al. [1]). Since we
are maximising a convex function {P2(z)2−P1(z)}, the maximum is attained at one of the extreme
points. In addition, these extreme points can be listed out as follows:
Let pi = (ai, bi) and let αi =arctan(ai/bi). We ﬁrst order α in an ascending order α(1) ≤α(2) . . .≤
α(n). The 2n extreme points are given by the following equations:
Ek =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if k= 0∑
j≤k p(j) if 1≤ k≤ n∑n
j=k+1−n p(j) if n+1≤ k≤ 2n− 1.
Once these points have been found, we can compare the objective values {E2(z)2 −E1(z)} only
among these 2n extreme points to ﬁnd the maximum. This takes O(n) operations and the sorting
of vector α takes n log(n) operations. Since we have to solve this problem n times, one for each
bidder, the complexity of the algorithm is O(n2 log(n)). 
Figure 1 demonstrates the algorithm for solving the CG problem for the case of n = 10 for
some ﬁxed i. Crossed generator points p = (p1, p2) are generated randomly with p1 following a
uniform distribution in [0,1] while p2 =
√
0.2u with u also following a uniform distribution. These
choices of these random points are only for the purpose of clearer demonstration in Figure 1. The
corresponding zonotope has 20 extreme points. The maximum of {P 22 −P1} is attained at E13. This
means z(j) =0, for 1≤ j ≤ 3 and z(j) = 1 for 4≤ j ≤ 10.
Theorem 3. The LP dual problem CSPPLPD in spectrum auction can be solved in polynomial
time.
Proof From Theorem 2, identifying a violating constraint for a given y can be done in O(n2 logn).
This means we have an ‘oracle-polynomial time’ to solve the separation problem. Therefore,
CSPPLPD can be solved in polynomial time using the ellipsoid method (see Theorem 6.4.9 in
Grotschel et al. [21]). 
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Figure 1 Zonotope demonstration for n= 10.
3.2. Finding the Optimal Coalition Structure in the WCSG games
The weighted coalitional skill games (WCSG) were proposed by Bachrach and Rosenschein [3]. In
this game, there are n players, T tasks and K skills. Each player has a subset of skills and each
task requires a subset of skills. Let Ψ be the player-skill matrix with ψik indicating whether player
i has skill k. Let Φ be the task-skill matrix with φtk indicating whether task t requires skill k. The
players can form groups to work collectively and a group can perform a task if the skills required
are available. Speciﬁcally, for each task t and the skill vector Φt that it requires, a coalition z will
be able to perform the task if, for all skill k, there exists at least one player in the coalition that
has skill φtk. Each task, if performed, returns some reward. The aim of the coalition structure
generation problem in the WCSG game is to divide players into non-overlapping subgroups such
that the total reward is maximised and this is equivalent to the CSPP problem. Bachrach and
Rosenschein (2008) show that the problem is NP-hard except for some very restricted cases, such as
with the bounded number of tasks and the bounded width of the tree that represent the skill-graph.
In addition, even with these restrictions, the authors only provide a polynomial-time algorithm
without any numerical result. We will apply our algorithm to ﬁnd near-optimal CSPP of general
WCSG games.
Let Δ(z, t) be the binary indicator on whether coalition z can perform task t and it is deﬁned
as:
Δ(z, t) =
{
1 if Ψtz ≥Φt,
0 otherwise.
We consider a weighted average utility function deﬁned as v(S) =∑t∈{1..T}ωtΔ(z, t). In this case,
the constraint generation problem minz∈{0,1}n {zty(k)− v(z)} can be reformulated as:
min
z∈{0,1}n
{
zty(k)−
T∑
t=1
ωtΔ(z, t)
}
.
15
This is equivalent to:
min
z,δ
{
zty(k)−
T∑
t=1
ωtδt
}
, (9)
s.t. Ψtz ≥ δtΦt, ∀t∈ 1, .., T, (10)
z ∈ {0,1}n,ψt ∈ {0,1}m,
where Δ(z, t) has been replaced by δt. The set of constraints in (10) ensures that if the coalition z
does not have all the skills required in Φt, then δt must be equal to zero. Otherwise, δt should be
equal to one to drive the objective function to the minimum. The constraint generation problem is
a mixed-integer programming problem with (n+T ) binary variables and with (T ∗K) constraints.
Although the problem is NP-hard, we will show numerically that CPLEX can solve the game very
eﬃciently for many instances with up to 200 players (with 20 tasks and 10 skills).
4. Numerical Tests
4.1. The Winner Determination Problem in Spectrum Auctions
We perform numerical tests on spectrum auctions with the number of frequencies ranging from
n= 25 to n= 200. The number of bidders is set to be equal to the number of frequencies. Matrix
Φ is generated randomly using the Bernoulli distribution where each bidder has a 50% chance
of having an interest in a frequency. The payoﬀ vector v and the synergy preference μ are also
generated randomly using the uniform distribution around [0,1].
Table 1 shows the performance of Algorithms 1-3 when the number of objects varies between 25
and 200. Columns 2-5 show statistics for solving the LP dual problem, columns 6-7 show statistics
for ﬁnding upper bounds, and column 8 shows the optimality bounds. In each column, the statistics
shown are obtained by taking the average over K = 10 random instances (using ﬁxed random seeds
between 1 and K in MATLAB for the purpose of convenient replication). By creating random
instances, we can test the robustness of the algorithm when the input data vary.1 In general, there
is an increasing trend with a cubic shape in the total time taken to solve the LP dual problem
except for the case of n = 50.2 The total time taken to solve the LP dual is around 85 minutes
for the largest instance. The number of iterations required by the constraint generation method
to solve the LP dual is relatively small compared to the problem size. Speciﬁcally, to solve the LP
dual with 2200 constraints for the case of n= 200, it took around 3273 iterations, on average, to
identify the set of relevant constraints. This means we only need to solve around 3273 constraint
generation problems and the same number of small-size LPs, each with n = 200 columns and
1All the numerical tests that appear in this manuscript are performed on a personal computer, Intel Xeon CPU
W3520 @2.67GHz with 12GB RAM and under the Windows 7 operating system. The code was written and tested
on MATLAB R2012a.
2Among 80 random instances generated, there were two outliers for the case of n= 50 with random seeds numbers
4 and 5.
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with the number of rows ranging between 1 and 3273. The time required to solve the constraint
generation problem increases almost in a quadratic trend and this matches with the theoretical
complexity of O(n2 logn) as derived in Theorem 2. The time taken to ﬁnd feasible packings is
relatively small compared to the time required to solve the LP relaxation with, at most, 20 minutes
for the largest instance. The optimality bounds between the feasible solutions and the LP upper
bounds are around 91.1%, which are reasonably good given the very large problem size. Notice that
this is the guaranteed bounds taken by f ∗sub/f
∗
LP as we have no knowledge of the optimal values.
The actual optimality bounds could be higher.
Solving LP dual Finding lower bounds Optimality bounds
n Total time Relaxed LPs CG # iterations Total time # iterations f ∗sub/f
∗
LP
25 4.92 0.87 3.77 215.6 0.10 3.2 97.46%
50 551.61 307.13 237.71 1437.5 1.82 3.9 94.24%
75 147.61 24.57 120.55 729.4 80.73 4.4 92.78%
100 265.85 46.89 215.38 1041 684.21 5 91.87%
125 526.54 129.23 391.27 1474.7 185.18 5.1 90.61%
150 966.3 289.23 667.92 1871.7 795.28 5.7 88.27%
175 2081.2 797.86 1267.8 2621.5 1202.3 6.2 86.94%
200 5060.1 2971.4 2064.2 3272.5 1005.9 6 86.42%
Table 1 Computational results for solving the winner determination problem in spectrum auctions
(computational time is in seconds)
4.2. Optimal Coalition Structure Generation in the Coalitional Skill Games
We also perform numerical tests on large WCSG games with the number of players n ranging
from 25 to 200 while ﬁxing the number of tasks at 20 and the number of skills at 10. For each n,
we generate K = 10 random samples using random seeds between 1 and K. In each instance, the
player-skill matrix is generated randomly using the Bernoulli distribution with a 25% chance for
each player to have a skill. The task-skill matrix is also generated randomly with a 50% chance
that each task requires a skill. The weighted vector is generated uniformly between [0,1].
Table 2 shows the same statistics as Table 1 but for ﬁnding the optimal coalition structures of
the WCSG with the number of players varying between 25 and 200 (i.e. columns 2-5 show statistics
for solving the LP dual problem, columns 6-7 show statistics for ﬁnding upper bounds and column
8 shows the optimality bounds). In each column, the average performance over K = 10 runs are
recorded. There is an increasing trend in the total time taken to solve the LP dual problem (with
less than 10 minutes for the largest instance). Most of the time taken is for solving the constraint
generation problems. The number of iterations to solve the LP dual is also relatively small with
just over 300 iterations for the largest instances tested. The time required to ﬁnd a feasible packing
solution is less than 1 second and this is signiﬁcantly small compared to the time taken to solve
the LP dual problem. The optimality gap is around 99.5% which is quite impressive.
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Solving LP dual Finding lower bounds Optimality bounds
n Total time Relaxed LPs CG # iterations Total time # iterations f ∗sub/f
∗
LP
25 2.48 0.036 2.42 36.4 0.023 14.3 98.58%
50 13.32 0.086 13.14 65.8 0.037 28.3 99.46%
75 42.24 0.466 41.35 126.9 0.367 44 99.12%
100 83.34 0.541 81.94 162.6 0.513 56.3 99.46%
125 160.00 0.393 158.59 195.9 0.646 71.7 99.78%
150 245.93 0.764 243.60 276.8 0.655 84.8 99.81%
175 402.52 0.343 400.66 239.8 0.875 100 99.78%
200 487.50 0.846 484.54 303.4 0.846 114.4 99.73%
Table 2 Computational results for finding the optimal coalition structure of the weighted coalitional skill games
(computational time is in seconds)
4.3. Random Instances from the CATS Library
The main aim of this manuscript is to ﬁnd an approximation algorithm for solving large-scale
SPP where the number of feasible subsets is very large, and hence cannot be handled by existing
methods. Our method is, however, applicable to any SPP game with m n. To demonstrate this,
we test the algorithm with randomly generated problems that appear in the CATS library developed
by Leyton-Brown and Shoham [27]. The value functions used in these instances have arisen in
combinatorial auctions where the underlying bids are accompanied with economical interpretations.
Tables 3 and 4 summarise the optimality bounds and the computational time for various random
distributions shown in the ﬁrst columns. Columns 2-5 show the optimality bounds for (n= 100)
objects while varying the number of feasible subsets between 2500 and 10000. Columns 6-7 show
the same statistics but for ﬁxed (m= 5000) while varying n between 50 and 150. The rows show
diﬀerent distributions from the CATS library for generating random instances. For each distribution
and each pair of (n,m), we generate K = 10 random instances. The statistics are taken from the
average performance among theseK instances. In general, it is interesting to see that the optimality
bounds increase with the increase of m. The optimality bounds are 100%, i.e. we obtain optimal
solutions, for the ‘paths’ and ‘scheduling’ distributions. The average is 99.3% for all cases. The
computational time is less than 1 minute for the worst instance tested.
n = 100 m = 5000
Distributions m= 2500 m= 5000 m=7500 m=10000 n=50 n= 100 n= 150
Arbitrary 95.25% 96.86% 98.15% 99.28% 99.08% 96.86% 96.91%
Paths 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Matching 99.94% 99.98% 99.99% 99.99% 100.00% 99.98% 100.00%
Regions 98.10% 98.58% 99.36% 99.38% 99.66% 98.58% 98.45%
Scheduling 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 3 Optimality bounds f∗sub/f
∗
LP for various random instances in the CATS library
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n = 100 m = 5000
Distributions m=2500 m= 5000 m= 7500 m= 10000 n= 50 n= 100 n= 150
Arbitrary 45.271 8.6534 6.7892 5.8766 1.7956 8.6534 210.85
Paths 0.35724 0.78781 1.2605 1.8112 0.70044 0.78781 0.93133
Matching 0.351 0.75504 1.2199 1.7831 0.81589 0.75504 0.81277
Regions 2.7628 2.6848 2.8923 3.3353 1.1435 2.6848 5.9795
Scheduling 0.34476 0.702 1.2262 1.8221 0.70356 0.702 0.72696
Table 4 Total computational time (in seconds) for various random instances in the CATS library
5. Conclusion
We provide an approximation method for solving the complete set packing problem (CSPP) where
the family of feasible subsets might be exponentially large. This includes a new mathematical
formulation with a much fewer number of binary variables that allows the direct pursuit of near-
optimal solutions. We also develop an algorithm for solving a large-scale MIP to obtain tighter
upper bounds to the CSPP. We show that the method works very eﬀectively, both in computational
time and the quality of the bounds obtained, with the applications in combinatorial auctions and
in cooperative game theory. Speciﬁcally, we show that recent results in ﬁxed-rank quadratic binary
programming can be extended to prove that the LP relaxation problem in spectrum auctions can
be solved in polynomial time. The fast performance of the constraint generation algorithm for
solving the LP relaxation problem of the coalitional skill games implies that the core and the least
core in these games can also be computed eﬃciently by using the same method. Results from this
research, particularly the new formulation for the CSPP, may stimulate future research to ﬁnd
alternative methods for solving large-scale SPP problems. Our algorithm for solving the large-scale
MIP could also be applicable to other applications that involve an exponentially large number of
continuous variables.
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